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1 Introduction.
Trade liberalization, will according to the popular view, shift power from
governments to firms and make it easier for firms to resist costly environ-
mental regulation by referring to their need to stay competitive. How-
ever, this argument only holds to the extent that tough environmental
regulation hurts competitiveness, and so long as governments respond to
reduced competitiveness by setting a less stringent environmental policy.
According to Porter [17] and to Porter and Linde [18] governments can
tighten their level of environmental regulation, and firms will find that
they become more competitive, not less. This has come to be coined the
Porter-hypothesis.
The Porter-hypothesis may be given at least two diﬀerent interpre-
tations. According to Porter and Linde [18] emissions are signs of inef-
ficiencies, that is, ”material” is wasted and not used for any ”purpose”.
Removing emissions will therefore lead to eﬃciency improvements in the
form of less ”material usage” per unit of the final product. Thus, in its
strong form the hypothesis basically says that firms will save costs on
environmental regulation, and that no weighting of abatement costs and
environmental benefits are necessary.
On the other hand, the Porter-hypothesis was first introduced as a
response to the claim that US firms had become less competitive due
to stringent environmental regulation during the the 1980’s. According
to Porter [17] the critics were wrong, and the right form of more strin-
gent regulation could spur international competitiveness1. A possible
weak interpretation of the Porter-hypothesis is then that a tough envi-
ronmental policy makes firms more internationally competitive than a
weak environmental policy.2
There exists a well developed strand of theoretical literature analyz-
ing the relationship between competitiveness and environmental policy,
see for instance Barrett [1], Conrad [5], Kennedy [15], Rauscher [19],
Bradford and Simpson [2], Ulph and Ulph[23] and Ulph[22]. This lit-
erature looks at oligopolistic export industries in which firms earn pure
profit. For such industries marginal cost can be used as a measure of
”competitiveness” (see Tirole [21], chapter 8). However, in many of the
contributions it is preassumed that environmental policy increases mar-
ginal costs, and the focus is instead solely on the choice of environmental
policy, see for example Barrett [1] and Rauscher [19].
Ulph [24] extends the basic model and covers research and devel-
1We will not venture into this part of the discussion here, but just mention that
Porter called for market based incentives instead of technology standards etc.
2Se Jaﬀe et al.[13] for more interpretations.
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opment of new, less polluting processes, partly in order to investigate
issue of competitiveness and the Porter-hypothesis more closely3. For
one version of the model in Ulph [24] a stringent environmental policy
leads to more competitive firms, that is, a higher emission tax makes
marginal cost decrease. The reason is that emissions per unit of output
falls due to the increased R&D eﬀort, and that this eﬀect dominates the
direct eﬀect of the higher tax. However, the extent to which govern-
ments should set a high emission tax in order to exploit this relationship
remains ambiguous.
Greaker [9] also provides results which are related to the Porter-
hypothesis. It is known from production theory that if an input is infe-
rior, marginal costs decrease when the price of the input increases (see
for example Gravelle and Rees [8]). Hence, to the extent that emissions
are inferior inputs, marginal cost could be decreasing in an emission tax
if you go from a situation with a low tax rate to a situation with a high
tax rate. This is studied in Greaker [9], and an analytical model based
on case studies suggests that emissions may be an inferior input to the
extent that abatement technology has scale advantages. It is further
shown that governments should exploit this in a strategic trade setting,
and set a high emission tax to take advantage of the scale property.
In this paper we will look at another possible explanation behind
the weak interpretation of the Porter-hypothesis. In the contributions
mentioned above, and in most other analyses, the point of departure is
that the development of new pollution abatement techniques happens
within the polluting firm 4. The analysis of environmental policy versus
competitiveness may then miss an important aspect. Take for example
the U.S. SO2 cap and trade program. According to Burtraw and Palmer
[4], the main savings from the program were due to increased competition
between abatement suppliers, and not from diﬀering abatement costs
among polluters.
When regulation changed from a technology standard to tradable
emission quotas, upstream industries such as railroad transportation,
scrubber manufacturing and coal mining companies were thrown into
competition with each other in a race to supply the electricity generating
industry with low cost compliance strategies. This lead the price of low
sulphur coal to fall by 9% even though total supply increased by 28%.
Further, coal transportation prices fell from 20-26 mills (one mill is one
tenth of a cent) per ton-mile to 10-14 mills per ton-mile. Lastly, the
eﬃciency of scrubbers was enhanced, leading to a drop in the price of
3Bradford and Simpson [2], Ulph and Ulph[23] and Ulph[22] include similar mod-
els.
4See also Downing and White[6] and Jung, Krutilla and Boyd[14].
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scrubbing measured as emission reduction per $.
Hence, we look at the relationship between competitiveness and envi-
ronmental policy in a model in which the supply of pollution abatement
services takes place in an imperfectly competitive upstream market. In
particular, we show that a tough environmental policy may improve
downstream competitiveness. A strong environmental policy increases
entry into the industry providing abatement services. This lowers the
price on pollution abatement and may consequently make the polluting
industry increasingly competitive. Accordingly, the government should
set an especially stringent environmental policy. On the other hand, the
incentive to set a stringent policy partly disappears if there is a global
market for pollution abatement services, and environmental policy is set
simultaneously in several countries.
The analysis also includes some other potentially interesting insights.
Firstly, we show that a stringent environmental policy could be recom-
mended even though competitiveness is hurt by a stringent environmen-
tal policy. The fact that the price of pollution abatement is decreasing in
the stringency of the environmental policy instrument both reduces the
strategic disadvantage of a stringent environmental policy, and provides
a separate incentive for setting a stringent policy. The extent to which
there already exists a well developed market for abatement services is
thus of high importance to the policy maker. Secondly, the availability
of an abatement subsidy does not necessarily change this result; environ-
mental policy should be still be stringent if environmental policy spurs
competitiveness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 to Section 5 presents the general results of the model.
All results are then illustrated by the use of examples in Section 6 and
Section 7. Section 8 looks at additional policy instruments, that is, two
kinds of subsidies. Section 9 concludes and oﬀers some suggestions for
further research.
2 The model
The model is an extension of the model in Ulph[24], and involves two
industries located in two separate countries referred to as the domestic
and the foreign country. Both the domestic and the foreign industry sells
its output in the same common market, and pollutes its local environ-
ment. The domestic and foreign government regulate their industries by
setting local emission quotas e¯ and E¯, respectively. The industries take
the emission quotas as given, and demand pollution abatement services
from an engineering sector in each country or one common i.e. trade
with pollution abatement services. The category pollution abatement
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services is defined broadly. That is, in order to reduce emissions the
downstream industry may have to implement a new process developed
by the abatement sector, or invest in new pollution abatement equip-
ment, or change to some new sort of raw materials, both supplied by
the upstream firms. Finally, the two polluting industries compete in
Cournot fashion by choosing their level of output.
In order to simplify, we focus on a single duopoly downstream with
only one domestic firm and one foreign firm. However, one can think
of both the domestic and the foreign downstream industry as consist-
ing of many firms, emitting the same type of pollutant, but competing
on diﬀerent duopoly markets outside both countries. According to the
World Bank Pollution Abatement Handbook[25] firms from diﬀerent in-
dustries often have similar pollution abatement needs. For instance,
electrostatic precipitators removing particles are sold to a whole range
of diﬀerent industries. The important assumption is that no single firm
has monopsony power in the market for pollution abatement services.
We start by analyzing the unilateral game. In this game only the do-
mestic government sets an emission quota, while the foreign government
is passive. Consequently, a market for pollution abatement solutions
only develops in the domestic country.
2.1 The pollution abatement technology
In order to comply with future environmental regulations the represen-
tative downstream polluting industry buys pollution abatement services
from the upstream engineering sector. Denote the extent to which an
abatement solution is implemented by x. Emissions, s, from the down-
stream industry is then given:
s = f(x, q), (1)
where q is output. The f function has the following derivatives: fq > 0,
fx ≤ 0, fxx > 0. The sign on the second order derivative fxximplies that
there are diminishing returns to abatement eﬀort.
In the first stage of the unilateral game the domestic government
sets an emission quota e¯, which implies s ≤ e¯. The foreign government
has no environmental policy, and sets no particular emission quota. The
domestic firm invests in abatement eﬀort exactly up to the level for which
the emission quota bites, which implies; f(x, q) = e¯. The abatement
eﬀort can then be written; x = x(q, e¯). It is easy to check that xe¯ ≤ 0
and that xq ≥ 0. We assume that xqe¯ < 0 in order to ensure that
emissions are normal inputs.5
5Emission may be inferior, see Greaker [9] for a discussion and analysis of emissions
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The downstream cost of abatement eﬀort is given by: wx (price w
times quantity x):
c(q, e¯) = wx(q, e¯). (2)
In the following we normalize all other costs of the downstream firm
to zero. We can then solve the game by backwards induction, and start
by looking at the third stage of the game:
2.2 The downstream export market
Let Q denote the output of the foreign downstream firm. Total rev-
enues of the domestic and the foreign firms are then y(q,Q) and Y (q,Q),
respectively. For the derivatives of the revenue functions , we have
∂y
∂Q
, ∂Y
∂q
< 0, meaning that the products are substitutes, and ∂
2y
∂Q∂q
, ∂
2Y
∂q∂Q
<
0, meaning that outputs are strategic substitutes.
With domestic costs equal to wx(q, e¯), and foreign costs normalized
to zero, the two first order conditions for profit maximum write:
∂π/∂q =
∂y
∂q
− wxq = 0, (3)
and
∂Π/∂Q =
∂Y
∂Q
= 0. (4)
The two first-order conditions determine the Nash-equilibrium out-
put quantities given the domestic emission quota. Assuming that the
second-order conditions for profit maximum hold, and that the unique-
ness condition for the Nash equilibrium is met6, output quantities can
be written as; q = q(w, e¯)) and Q = Q(w, e¯). It is further easy to show
that we have:
dq
de¯ | dwde¯ =0
> 0 and
dq
dw
< 0, (5)
dQ
de¯ | dwde¯ =0
< 0 and
dQ
dw
> 0. (6)
(See Appendix A1 for a complete derivation of the Nash equilibrium
and the comparative statics results).
Since the foreign downstream firm is not obliged to do abatement,
a price increase on pollution abatement only aﬀects the domestic firm
negatively. On the contrary, the foreign firm benefits, since in the new
Nash equilibrium, profit is shifted towards the foreign firm.
as inferior/normal inputs. In the current paper we confine the analysis to emissions
as normal inputs.
6See the discussion about uniqueness in Tirole[21], page 225-226.
7
2.3 The upstream pollution abatement market
In order to start supplying pollution abatement services, the engineering
firm has to obtain basic knowledge and experience about possible ap-
proaches to the pollution problem at hand, and/or license a particular
technology from an inventor. This implies some fixed costs of setting up
a pollution abatement firm. Clearly, there may be positive externalities
between pollution abatement firms; for instance, a knowledge base may
be easier to obtain if there are more firms working on the same problem.
One way of modelling this is to let the fixed entry cost be decreasing in
the number of upstream firms. This is also another way of saying that
firms can (imperfectly) imitate each other’s approaches (see Haaland and
Wooton[10] for a similar approach).
Having solved for downstream output above, we may write total de-
mand for pollution abatement solutions, x:
x = x(q(w, e¯), e¯), (7)
which can be inverted to a demand function for pollution abatement
services:
w = w(e¯, x). (8)
Diﬀerentiating (7) we get:
dw
dx
=
1
xq
dq
dw
< 0, (9)
that is, the demand function is downward sloping.
At any time, there are n firms in the pollution abatement sector.
Competition in the sector is modelled as Cournot-Nash with free entry.
Even though we assume that the engineering firms oﬀer perfect substi-
tutes, this does not necessarily imply that they oﬀer identical technolo-
gies, but only that the diﬀerent technologies are equally eﬃcient with
respect to emission abatement.
Denote the variable cost of supplying abatement solutions α, and
denote the fixed cost of entering the abatement eﬀort marked by f =
f(n) with f  ≤ 0, and d[nf(n)]
dn
= f(n) + nf  > 0, i.e. the sum of entry
costs is increasing in n. Each abatement firm then maximizes profit Ω
taking e¯ and n as given:
max
xi
%
w(e¯,
n[
i=1
xi)− α
&
xi − f(n), (10)
Assuming that upstream firms are symmetric, and solving this prob-
lem, we get: x1 = ... = xi = ... = xn = x¯(n, e¯). We may then find n
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from:
Ωi = [w(e¯, nx¯(n, e¯))− α] x¯(n, e¯)− f(n) = 0, (11)
which yields: n = n(e¯). Total supply of pollution abatement can then
be written; x = n(e¯)x¯(n(e¯), e¯). Inserting the expression n(e¯)x¯(n(e¯), e¯)
back into the expression for the price, we finally getw = w(e¯, n(e¯)x¯(n(e¯), e¯)) =
w(e¯).
In the general case, the sign on the derivative dw
de¯
is ambiguous. In
Appendix C1 and C4 we solve the model for a linear export demand
function and the following emission function; f(x, q) = ( υ
σx+µ
)q where υ,
σ, µ are parameters, and find that dw
de¯
> 0 independent of the existence
of positive externalities between abatement firms i.e. f (n) = 0 . We
also solve the model for a proportional emission standard, linear export
demand and the following emission function: f(x, q) = q−√qx. Again,
we find that dw
d(1−r) > 0 for f
(n) = 0, where (1−r) is maximum emissions
per unit of output. See also Appendix B for further details.
3 Competitiveness and environmental policy
As already argued, we associate competitiveness with the level of mar-
ginal cost wxq(q, e¯). If marginal cost decreases with a tightening emission
quota, competitiveness is improving in the stringency of environmental
policy as predicted by the Porter-hypothesis. The following proposition
states the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for this to happen:
Proposition 1 Competitiveness is improving when the emission quota
is tightened if and only if ∂w
∂e¯
xq > |wxqe¯|. Hence, a necessary condition
is dw
de¯
> 0.
A smaller emission quota has two eﬀects: Firstly, it increases mar-
ginal cost through the term xqe¯, that is, for each additional increase
in output, the firm has to do more pollution abatement the smaller the
emission quota. Secondly, it may lower the price on environmental R&D.
This makes abatement less costly, which may completely outweigh the
first eﬀect.
The condition∂w
∂e¯
xq > |wxqe¯|, results in a weak form of the Porter-
hypothesis:
Proposition 2 In the unilateral policy case, if ∂w
∂e¯
xq > |wxqe¯|, export
output improves when the emission quota is tightened, that is, dq
de¯
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix A1.
In an example below, we show that positive externalities between
pollution abatement firms, mean that the domestic government can de-
mand higher emission reductions, and at the same time increase export
output.
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4 Optimal domestic emission quota
Our benchmark is the first-best rule for optimal environmental policy
i.e. marginal abatement cost should equal marginal environmental dam-
age. If the welfare maximizing environmental policy in the unilatteral
game diverts from the first best rule, we will say that environmental
policy is lax/stringent depending on whether marginal abatement cost
is lower/higher than marginal environmental damage.
Welfare is given by the net surplus NS generated by the domestic
downstream firm:
NS = y(q(w(e¯), e¯), Q(w(e¯), e¯))− w(e¯)x(q(w(e¯), e¯), e¯)− d(e¯), (12)
where the two first terms is the profit of the firm and the last element
d(e¯) is an environmental damage function with d > 0, d ≥ 0.
Note that the upstream market is not a part of the expression, since
there is zero profit in the sector. The revenue generated in this sector
is equal to total R&D cost, which again is equal to the total amount of
resources consumed by the sector.
Denote the derivative dq
de¯ | dwde¯ =0 by just
dq
de¯
, and denote x(q(w(e¯), e¯), e¯)
by x(q, e¯). The first order condition for maximizing net surplus then
becomes:
dNS
de¯
= [yq − w(e¯)xq]
dq
de¯
+ yQ
dQ
de¯
− ∂w
∂e¯
x(q, e¯)− w(e¯)xe¯ − d = 0, (13)
where the first term is zero by the first order condition for profit
maximum (see Appendix A1). By rearranging terms and using that
dQ
de¯
= ∂Q
∂w
dw
de¯
+ ∂Q
∂e¯ |dwde¯ =0 , we get:
yQ
∂Q
∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0
+
%
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
&
dw
de¯
= − |w(e¯)xe¯|+ d. (14)
The left hand side presents the ”external” eﬀects of environmental
regulation, that is, the strategic eﬀect yQ ∂Q∂e¯ |dwde¯ =0 and an abatement price
eﬀect;
k
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
l
dw
de¯
.
While the strategic eﬀect is discussed extensively in the literature, the
price eﬀect has not been discussed before. To the extent that dw
de¯
> 0, the
price eﬀect works in two ways, which both tends to make environmental
policy more stringent. Firstly, the term yQ
∂Q
∂w
provides another strategic
eﬀect, that is, when the price on pollution abatement falls, the foreign
firm is aﬀected negatively, and profit is shifted towards the domestic firm.
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Secondly, the price eﬀect has a direct cost-reducing eﬀect on pollution
abatement by −x(q, e¯).
The term
w(e¯)dx
de¯
 at the right hand side represents marginal abate-
ment cost, while the term d is marginal environmental damage (hence-
forth; mac. and med., respectively). Thus, the first best rule implies
−
w(e¯)dx
de¯
+ d = 0.
Denote the right and left hand side of (14) by HS and LS, respec-
tively. We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Environmental policy should be either stringent or lax
according to:
1. If ∂w
∂e¯
> 0,and if yQ
∂Q
∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0 <

k
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
l
dw
de¯
, that is, the
price eﬀect dominates the strategic eﬀect, LS is negative, and HS
must be negative. Hence, the government should set a stringent
environmental policy.
2. If ∂w
∂e¯
> 0,and if yQ
∂Q
∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0 >

k
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
l
dw
de¯
, that is, the
strategic eﬀect dominates the price eﬀect, LS is positive, and HS
must be positive. Hence, the government should set a lax environ-
mental policy.
3. Lastly, if ∂w
∂e¯
≤ 0, LS is always positive. The government should
then set a lax environmental policy.
Note that dq
de¯ |dwde¯ =0 < 0 is not a necessary condition for environmen-
tal policy to be stringent. The intuition is that an undeveloped market
for new pollution abatement techniques requires a more stringent envi-
ronmental policy in order to develop, and spur the diﬀusion of the new
techniques. This incentive may be so strong that the government actu-
ally ends up setting a stringent environmental policy independent of the
eﬀect on competitiveness.
On the other hand, dq
de¯ | dwde¯ =0 < 0 is a suﬃcient condition for environ-
mental policy to be stringent. In the latter case we have yQ
∂Q
∂e¯ |dwde¯ =0 <yQ ∂Q∂w dwde¯
, and the condition yQ ∂Q∂e¯ |dwde¯ =0 <

k
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
l
dw
de¯
 is auto-
matically fulfilled.
5 The policy game
We now turn to the policy game, and assume that the domestic and for-
eign governments set their emission quotas simultaneously. There are at
least two options with respect to how the upstream market for pollution
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abatement services should be treated. One could think of situations in
which supplying pollution abatement services required closeness to the
polluting firms. Consequently, separate upstream sectors would develop
in the two countries, and the price of pollution abatement services could
diﬀer between the upstream markets. Alternatively, abatement services
could be tradable crossboarders. Hence, the price on pollution abate-
ment service would be equalized between the two countries. We start
looking into this latter option.
Assume that the downstream firms are symmetric, and let the foreign
emission quota be denoted E¯. The foreign demand for pollution abate-
ment solutions can then be written; X = X(Q, E¯), and the foreign cost
function C(Q, E¯) = wX(Q, E¯) where the price on pollution abatement
solutions w is the same for both downstream firms.
The third stage Nash equilibrium output quantities can then be writ-
ten as; q = q(w, e¯, E¯)) and Q = Q(w, e¯, E¯). Further, it is easy to show:
dq
de¯ |dwde¯ =0
> 0 and
dq
dw |e¯=E¯ < 0, (15)
dQ
dE¯ | dwde¯ =0
> 0 and
dQ
dw |e¯=E¯ < 0. (16)
Note that the signs on dq
dw
and dQ
dw
are both ambiguous; it is only
when e¯ = E¯ that the derivatives can be signed. Since both firms are
supposed to do pollution abatement, a price increase on abatement neg-
atively aﬀects both firms. If one of the firms is required to do very little
abatement compared to the other firm, the signs on the derivatives may
diﬀer, though. (See Appendix A2 for a derivation of the the comparative
statics results).
Total demand for abatement services is then:
Z = x(q(w, e¯, E¯), e¯) +X(Q(w, e¯, E¯), E¯). (17)
Z can be inverted:
w = w(e¯, E¯, Z).
The Cournot-Nash, free-entry equilibrium in the upstream market
can then be found as above, and the price on environmental R&D can
finally be written; w = w(e¯, E¯).
Net surplus NS generated by the domestic and foreign downstream
firms, respectively, are:
NSd = y(q(w(e¯, E¯), e¯, E¯), Q(w(e¯, E¯), e¯, E¯)) (18)
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−w(e¯, E¯)x(q(w(e¯, E¯), e¯, E¯), e¯)− d(e¯),
NSf = Y (q(w(e¯, E¯), e¯, E¯), Q(w(e¯, E¯), e¯, E¯)) (19)
−w(e¯, E¯)X(Q(w(e¯, E¯), e¯, E¯), E¯)− d(E¯),
where subscript d denote domestic and subscript f denote foreign.
The first order conditions for maximizing domestic and foreign net
surplus imply dNSd
de¯
=
dNSf
dE¯
= 0. We assume that the policy equilib-
rium is unique. Since the countries and firms are symmetric, the policy
equilibrium must be symmetric. Hence, we only need to look at one of
the first order conditions, and use that e¯ = E¯ in equilibrium After some
rearranging we get:
yQ
∂Q
∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0
+
%
yQ
∂Q
∂w |e¯=E¯ − x(q, e¯)
&
dw
de¯
= −
w(e¯, E¯)xe¯
+ d, (20)
The strategic eﬀect yQ ∂Q∂e¯ |dwde¯ =0 is unchanged from the unilateral case.
However, the price eﬀect
k
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
l
dw
de¯
is moderated. To the extent
that dw
de¯
> 0, the price eﬀect now works in two opposite ways. Instead
of providing another strategic eﬀect which makes environmental policy
more stringent, the term yQ ∂Q∂w |e¯=E¯ dwde¯ now pulls in the same direction
as the ordinary strategic eﬀect yQ ∂Q∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0 . This happens because when
e¯ = E¯, we have ∂Q
∂w
< 0 instead of ∂Q
∂w
> 0 as in the unilateral case.
We denote the terms yQ

∂Q
∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0 +
∂Q
∂w |e¯=E¯ dwde¯

the ”combined strate-
gic eﬀect”. On the other hand, the term −x(q, e¯)dw
de¯
still provides an
incentive to set a stringent environmental policy since a stringent policy
still yields a cost reduction.
Assume ∂w
∂e¯
> 0, the following proposition explores the two policy
outcomes:
Proposition 4 In the policy game with a global pollution abatement
market environmental policy will be either stringent or lax according to:
1. If yQ

∂Q
∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0 +
∂Q
∂w |e¯=E¯ dwde¯

< x(q, e¯)dw
de¯
, that is ”the combined
strategic eﬀect” is dominated by the ”environmental R&D cost re-
duction”, LS is negative, and HS must be negative. Hence, gov-
ernments will set a stringent environmental policy.
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2. If yQ

∂Q
∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0 +
∂Q
∂w |e¯=E¯ dwde¯

> x(q, e¯)dw
de¯
, that is ”the combined
strategic eﬀect” dominates the ”environmental R&D cost reduc-
tion”,LS is positive, and HS must be positive. Hence, governments
will set a lax environmental policy.
Note that ∂w
∂e¯
xq > |wxqe¯| is no longer a suﬃcient condition for envi-
ronmental policy to be stringent. We may have ∂w
∂e¯
xq > |wxqe¯|, but all
the same dq
de¯ | dwde¯ =0 > 0. The intuition is that even though the absolute
competitiveness of the domestic firm is increasing when the emission
quota is tightened, the relative competitiveness is not. As the price on
pollution abatement falls, the foreign firm also benefits, and hence, we
may have dq
de¯ | dwde¯ =0 > 0 even if
∂w
∂e¯
xq > |wxqe¯|.
The diﬀerence between the unilateral and the global case is exampli-
fied in the next section.
6 Example
It is not trivial to find an emission function and an export demand func-
tion which make it possible to solve the model analytically. Combined
with the linear demand function p = m − q − Q, the emission function
f(x, q) = ( υ
σx+µ
)q is especially simple to work with. This implies that
emissions are proportional to output, and that pollution abatement ser-
vices reduce the emission intensity of production. There are diminishing
returns to abatement eﬀort, and emissions are normal factors. Finally,
we apply f(n) = 2β
2
3(n+1)φ , φ ≥ 0, for the entry costs.
Note also that the emission function inhibits increasing returns to
production scale q with respect to the eﬀect of abatement. That is, the
cost wx ”per abated emissions” ((υ
µ
− υ
σx+µ
)q) for any abatement level x,
and for a given price w, is decreasing in the level of output. This is clearly
the case if the solution to the pollution problem at hand is to redesign
parts of the production process. One example is the process modifi-
cations in industrial burners in order to reduce emissions of NOx (see
World Bank, Pollution Abatement Handbook [25]). Hartman, Wheeler
and Singh [11] also report that ”average abatement costs drop sharply
as abatement volume increases” in their study of the cement, pulp and
paper and iron and steel industries.
The example is solved in the Appendix C1. Here, we illustrate with
results from one version of the model: Let σ = υ = µ = 1, p = 30−q−Q
where p is the export market price, α = 0.3, and β = 3. Solving the
model for diﬀerent φ, yields the following schedules for marginal cost
wxq (See Figure 1):
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Figure 1. Emissions and competitiveness
Note that with no spillovers i.e. φ = 0, competitiveness is hampered
as the emission quota is decreased (moving from right to left along the x-
axis). However, even with spillovers as small as φ = 0.1, competitiveness
is improving as the emission quota is reduced from 7.5 to 4. With more
spillovers, that is, φ = 0.5 or 0.9, the eﬀect is strengthened.
We then turn the maximization of net surpluss in the unilateral policy
and policy game case:
Table I
Game type emiss.red.mac. med. φ Domestic NS
Unilateral policy 88% (21.2) (2.4) (0.0) (59.9)
Policy game (63%) (7.5) (7.4) (0.0) (66.8)
Unilateral policy (89%) (16.5) (2.2) (0.5) (72.6)
Policy game (72%) (5.6) (5.6) (0.5) (81.4)
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(The emission functions; s = q
x+1
/S = Q
X+1
, export demand; p =
m−q−Q, fixed cost of entry; f(n) = 2β2
3(n+1)φ and environmental damage;
δ(e¯)2. For the parameters we have used: m = 30, α = 0.3, β = 3, δ = 1)
There are a number of interesting aspects in these figures. First, do-
mestic emission reductions are much higher in the two unilateral cases
than in the policy game cases. The reason is that the price eﬀect is
much weaker in the policy game cases (with a common market for pol-
lution abatement services). Second, even though there are no spillovers,
φ = 0, marginal abatement cost exceeds marginal environmental dam-
age in the unilateral policy case. The strategic eﬀect yQ ∂Q∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0 is neg-
ative, but this is by far outweighed by the big value on price eﬀect;
k
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
l
dw
de¯
. (See outcome one in Proposition 3).
Third, observe that environmental policy is neither stringent nor lax
in the policy game cases. This is the case, even though a stringent
environmental policy improves the absolute competitiveness of the firms
when φ = 0.5. Again the reason is the weakened price eﬀect.
Lastly, note that domestic net surplus is higher in the policy game.
Profit is shifted towards the domestic firm when the foreign firm is reg-
ulated, and this increases net surpluss all other things equal. Note that
domestic net surplus is not higher because a greater total demand for
abatement solutions leads to lower prices. The level of regulation in both
countries are too lax with a global abatement market to induce lower
prices on abatement compared with the unilateral case. The price on
abatement is 3.90 in the unilateral case (with no spillovers), while the
price on abatement in the global abatement market case is 11.40 (with
no spillovers).
7 Local markets for environmental R&D
We now assume independent markets for pollution abatement, and dif-
fering prices on abatement eﬀort among countries. Let W denote the
price on foreign abatement, and the foreign cost function can be written
C(Q, E¯) = WX(Q, E¯).
The third stage Nash equilibrium output quantities can then be writ-
ten as; q = q(w,W, e¯, E¯)) and Q = Q(w,W, e¯, E¯). See Appendix A3 for
the derivation of the comparative statics results:
dq
de¯ | dwde¯ =0
> 0,
dq
dw
< 0 and
dq
dW
> 0, (21)
dQ
dE¯ | dwde¯ =0
> 0,
dQ
dw
> 0 and
dQ
dW
< 0. (22)
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Domestic demand for pollution abatement services then becomes:
x = x(q(w,W, e¯, E¯), e¯).
Inverting yields:
w = w(e¯, x, E¯,W ),
and respectively for the foreign upstream market.
The Cournot-Nash, free-entry equilibrium in both upstream markets
can be found as above. The price on abatement solutions can finally be
written; w = w(e¯, E¯) andW =W (e¯, E¯). Hence, q = q(w(e¯, E¯),W (e¯, E¯), e¯, E¯)
andQ = Q(w(e¯, E¯),W (e¯, E¯), e¯, E¯) shortened to q(w,W, e¯, E¯) andQ(w,W, e¯, E¯).
Net surplus NS generated by the domestic and foreign downstream
firms, respectively:
NSd = y(q(w,W, e¯, E¯), Q(w,W, e¯, E¯) (23)
−w(e¯, E¯)x(q(w,W, e¯, E¯), e¯)− d(e¯),
NSf = Y (q(w,W, e¯, E¯), Q(w,W, e¯, E¯)) (24)
−W (e¯, E¯)X(Q(w,W, e¯, E¯), E¯)− d(E¯).
where subscript d and f denotes domestic and foreign, respectively.
A first order condition for maximizing net surplus then obtains when
dNSd
de¯
=
dNSf
dE¯
= 0.
As above we only look at one of the first order conditions, and use
that e¯ = E¯ in a symmetric equilibrium. After some rearranging we
obtain:
yQ
∂Q
∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0
+
%
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
&
dw
de¯
+ yQ
∂Q
∂W
dW
de¯
= −
w(e¯, E¯)xe¯
+ d,
Both the strategic eﬀect yQ ∂Q∂e¯ | dwde¯ =0 and the price eﬀect
k
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
l
dw
de¯
are unchanged from the unilateral policy case. However, there may be a
foreign price eﬀect yQ ∂Q∂W
dW
de¯
which sign is ambiguous. 7
7To the extent that dqde¯ > 0, a stringent domestic environmental policy would
ceteris paribus lead to an increase in foreign output and foreign demand for abatement
eﬀort. This could decrease the foreign price of abatement, i.e. dWde¯ > 0, and further
increase the output of the foreign firm through the term ∂Q∂W . Hence, in this case, the
foreign price eﬀect comes as an addition to the normal strategic eﬀect, and we may
still get a less stringent policy in the policy game than in the unilateral case. On
the other hand, to the extent that dqde¯ < 0, the eﬀect would be the other way around,
and the foreign price eﬀect would provide an additional incentive to set a stringent
policy.
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In our numerical example with a linear export demand and a pro-
portional emission function, it turns out that the foreign price eﬀect
vanishes when φ = 0 i.e. dW
de¯
= dw
dE¯
= 0 (this is an artifact of that par-
ticular model). Below we compare the results from the two upstream
market set-ups:
Table II
Policy game % emiss.red. mac. med. Domestic NS
Local markets (88%) (24.2) (2.4) (78.1)
Global markets (63%) (7.5) (7.4) (66.8)
(m = 30, α = 0.3, β = 3, φ = 0 and δ = 1)
Note that net surplus is higher in the policy game with two local
markets than with one global market. The reason is that the emission
quota is set much more stringent in the policy game with two local mar-
kets. This is possible because the price eﬀect
k
yQ
∂Q
∂w
− x(q, e¯)
l
dw
de¯
, which
favours a stringent policy, is stronger with two local markets due to the
diﬀerence in sign on the derivative ∂Q
∂w
. Actually, in our example, the
policy equilibrium with two local markets, is very close to the optimum
when joint welfare is maximized. On the other hand, the policy equilib-
rium in the global market case is a typical Prisoners Dilemma.
8 Abatement subsidies
Since there is more than one externality present in the model, net sur-
pluss is likely to improve if more policy instruments become available.
Increasing the number of instruments could also change the conclusions
about the desirability of a stringent environmental policy. From the
point of view of the domestic government the first best would be 1)
to have a regulated monopoly in the upstream sector supplying abate-
ment services at price equal to marginal cost α, 2) to subsidize export
directly and 3) to set the level of environmental regulation to equalize
marginal abatement cost and marginal environmental damages8. The
GATT treaty includes measures designed to keep governments from us-
ing point 2) above. Further, it may be a problem for governments to
8Point 2) and 3) is shown by Barrett[1]. Point 1) should be evident since there
are no diﬀerence between the R&D firms in the model, and duplicating fixed cost
only serves to increase competition between up-stream firms.
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regulate a pollution abatement monopoly, that is, choose the right tech-
nology and price.Then second best solutions may occur.
One option for the government is to subsidize the abatement costs
of the downstream firms. Such a subsidy is explicitly mentioned in the
GATT rules as a non-actional subsidy provided that the subsidy is lim-
ited to 20% of costs (see point c), Article 8, Part 4, in Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the GATT treaty [7]). Alter-
natively, the government may choose to subsidize the abatement firms
directly by paying a part of their entry costs. This could possibly qualify
as assistance for research activities defined as ”pre-competitive develop-
ment activity” (see point a), Article 8, Part 4, in Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, the GATT treaty [7]). Such a subsidy is
limited to 50% of costs.
Let Γ ≤ 0, 2 denote the share of the downstream industry’s abate-
ment costs paid by the government. The cost of the downstream firm is
then:
c(q, e¯) = (1− Γ)wx(q, e¯), (25)
which implies that downstream output can be written q = q((1 −
Γ)w, e¯). Note that the subsidy directly improves the competitiveness of
the downstream firm.
Further, the subsidy works through the upstream market. The up-
stream demand function becomes: x = x(q((1−Γ)w, e¯), e¯) which can be
inverted to w = w(e¯,x)
(1−Γ) where w is the price on abatement eﬀort charged
by the upstream firms. Solving as in Section 2 yields xi = xi(n, e¯,Γ).
By inserting back into the profit expression, we get n = n(e¯,Γ), and
finally w = w(e¯,Γ). Note that ∂w
∂Γ > 0 is possible, and in fact is the case
if we solve for a subsidy in our example. The reason is that the sub-
sidy makes demand for abatement services more inelastic, and thereby
allows a higher mark-up on pollution abatement services! However, we
may still have ∂q
∂Γ > 0, if the direct eﬀect of the subsidy on marginal cost
−wxq dominates the indirect eﬀect (1−Γ)xq ∂w∂Γ , which is the case in our
example.
Looking at the net surplus maximum in the unilateral case, the fol-
lowing proposition follows from the first order conditions (see Appendix
D):
Proposition 5 If ∂w
∂e¯
, ∂w
∂Γ > 0, and if
∂q
∂Γ > 0 and
∂q
∂e¯
< 0, environmental
policy should always be stringent. If ∂w
∂e¯
, ∂w
∂Γ ,
∂q
∂Γ ,
∂q
∂e¯
> 0, environmental
policy should be stringent as long as ∂w
∂e¯
> ∂w
∂Γ
dq
de¯
dq
dΓ
.
Proof. See Appendix D.
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If environmental policy spurs competitiveness i.e. ∂q
∂e¯
< 0, environ-
mental policy should be set stringent even if an abatement subsidy is
used. Further, even if environmental policy does not spur competitive-
ness i.e. ∂q
∂e¯
> 0, the government may still choose to set a stringent
environmental policy. Thus, in general, the presence of an abatement
subsidy does not remove the incentives for setting a stringent environ-
mental policy. The result is clearly influenced by the fact that the price
on pollution abatement services is distorted upwards by the subsidy i.e.
∂w
∂Γ > 0. This makes marginal abatement cost appear higher, and conse-
quently, marginal abatement cost should exceed marginal environmental
damage.
With respect to an entry subsidy, it is harder to get unambiguous
results. We have therefore analyzed both types of subsidies with the help
of our numerical model (see Appendix C6 for the analytical treatment
of the subsidies). Optimal policies with no spillovers are given:
Table III
Unilateral policy emiss.red.mac. med. % subsidyDomestic NS
No subsidies 88% (21.2) (2.4) (0%) (59.9)
Abatement subsidy 88% (24.3) (2.4) (20%) (59.5)
Entry subsidy 84% (12.2) (3.2) (50%) (54.5)
(The emission functions; s = q
x+1
/S = Q
X+1
, export demand; p =
m − q − Q, fixed cost of entry; f(n) = 2β2
3
and environmental damage;
δ(e¯)2. For the parameters we have used: m = 30, α = 0.3, β = 3, δ = 1)
Some moments are worth mentioning. Maybe the most striking result
from the simulation is that the subsidies do not improve net surpluss as
long as spillovers are absent. With respect to the abatement subsidy,
it allows a higher mark-up, consequently entry increases and we get too
many firms which each supplies to few abatement services. The story is
much the same with an entry subsidy. The entry subsidy leads to too
much entry which is ineﬃcient as long as each firm reduces their output
of abatement services. (See for instance Mankiw and Whinston [16] for
a general analysis of free entry and social eﬃciency in Cournot markets).
Secondly, note that a stringent environmental policy is always opti-
mal even though subsidies are provided and environmental policy does
not spur competitiveness (the no spillovers case).
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9 Discussion
In our model the pollution abatement technology does not improve the
higher the number of environmental innovation firms, that is, there are
no love of variety eﬀects as in other contributions with an upstream-
downstream structure. Hence, the only mechanism through which a
more stringent environmental policy works, is to enlarge the market
for new pollution abatement techniques and allow for lower mark-ups.
Note that a mark-up is necessary in order for the engineering firms to
cover their fixed costs. The analysis in the paper, at least as long as
φ = 0 (the no spillover case), could therefore be interpreted as a sort of
bench mark. Introducing a love of variety eﬀect would presumably only
strengthen the case for a stringent environmental policy, although less
fierce price competition between abatement suppliers could pull in the
other direction.
Our work also is also related to the empirical literature on experi-
ence curves. In its basic form, an experience curve explores the causal
relationship between accumulated production at time t and average cost
of production at time t [12]. The results derived in Section 3 should
hold for all kinds of development processes for which a higher demand
leads to a lower price. As long as the stringency of environmental policy
and the price on pollution abatement services are negatively correlated,
environmental policy will have a price eﬀect. Further, when such price
eﬀects do not spill over to foreign and competing countries, policy should
be set more stringent than without this eﬀect.
Further, as shown in the paper, matters are diﬀerent when the price
eﬀect spills over to other countries as in the case with a global abatement
market. The policy equilibrium is then likely to be a Prisoners Dilemma,
and some coordination of either environmental policy or research eﬀort
may be warranted. Note that having a global market for abatement
solutions is not the only way the price eﬀect could spill over. Another
possible implementation could be to have to local markets, but to let
knowledge about abatement solutions spill over. Within the current set
up this could be accomplished by letting the upstream entry cost be
dependent on the total number of firms, that is, the sum of domestic
and foreign upstream firms.
Some caveats are in order. For example, the modelling of positive ex-
ternalities in the abatement service sector has an ad hoc flavor. A better
approach would be to have sequential entry in the upstream industry,
and decreasing entry cost in line with the ”standing on the shoulders
of others” argument (see Romer [20]). On the other hand, this would
have required a dynamic model of much higher complexity. Further,
we focus on examples with a high upstream entry cost and a low mar-
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ginal cost of providing abatement solutions. Clearly, if the fixed cost
is low, many firms will enter the pollution abatement service sector for
any environmental policy, and our case will approach the case for which
∂w
∂e¯
= 0.
Finally, the analysis so far does not contain any comparison of dif-
ferent environmental policy instruments. In the Appendix we solve the
model for a proportional emission standard. Unfortunately, we are un-
able to draw any general conclusions about the desirability of diﬀerent
instruments. In general, it is more diﬃcult to solve the model for an
emission tax. Hence, future research aiming to compare diﬀerent in-
struments, will have to rely more heavily on numerical simulations than
analytical approaches.
The paper provides both some support for, and a possible explana-
tion of the Porter-hypothesis. One could argue that the model is quite
special; we only look at Cournot competition, many firms demand the
same pollution abatement techniques, but competes on diﬀerent markeds
etc. However, the result that policy should be more stringent when a
well developed market for abatement services does not exist, and are
likely to be imperfectly competitive, clearly has some general appeal.
Further, as importantly, we have discovered that even though a weak
form of the Porter-hypothesis could hold, governments may still set a
weak environmental policy in the Nash policy equilibrium provided that
the market for abatement services is a global market.
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A Derivation of the export market Nash equilib-
rium
A.1 Unilateral policy (proof of Prop. 2)
Total revenues of the domestic and the foreign firms are y(q,Q) and
Y (q,Q) respectively. Assuming that the two products are substitutes,
we have yQ, Yq < 0. It is also assumed that yqQ and YQq are negative in
order to ensure that the outputs of the two firms are strategic substitutes.
Given the emission standard e¯ and the supply of environmental R&D
x, both firms are taken to maximize profits:
max
q
π = y(q,Q) given f(x, q) ≤ e¯ (26)
and
max
Q
Π = Y (q,Q) (27)
respectively. Note that the foreign representative firm has no constraint,
because there is no foreign environmental policy.
The condition f(x, q) ≤ e¯ can be rewritten q ≤ q(x, e¯). Thus, the
emission quota actually puts an upper bound on output since the supply
of environmental R&D is given from the stage before the market game.
One question is then whether the firm will choose excess environmental
R&D so that f(x, q) < e¯ in the third stage Nash equilibrium. If the
firm has invested in excess environmental R&D, the firm must be on its
unbounded reaction curve given by:
∂
∂q
[y(q,Q)] = yq = 0. (28)
Since additional environmental R&D has no eﬀect upon the reac-
tion curve, and thereby, not on the Nash-equilibrium output, surplus
environmental R&D can only increase costs. Hence, we are left with
the alternative that the firm invests exactly up to the level where the
emission quota starts to bite i.e. f(x, q) = e¯.
In the case of a binding emission quota, the three stage game with
sequential R&D and output decisions is in fact identical to a two stage
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game with simultaneous R&D and output decisions.9 We can therefore
proceed directly to look at second stage profit maximization:
max
x
π = y(q(x, e¯), Q)− wx
Since q = q(x, e¯) and x = x(q, e¯), this can alternatively be expressed:
max
q
π = y(q,Q)− wx(q, e¯) (29)
The two first order conditions for profit maximization are then:
∂π/∂q = yq − wxq = 0, (30)
and
∂Π/∂Q = YQ = 0. (31)
The two first-order conditions determine the Nash-equilibrium out-
put quantities given the domestic emission quota. It is assumed that
the second-order conditions for profit maximization hold, and that the
uniqueness condition for the Nash-equilibrium is met10. Output quan-
tities can then be written as functions of the emission quota, and the
price of pollution abatement in the following manner; q = q(w, e¯) and
Q = Q(w, e¯).
Further, we look at the comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium
in the export market taking into consideration that ∂w
∂e¯
9= 0. Total
diﬀerentiation of the system (30) and (31) yields:
(yqq − wxqq)dq + yqQdQ− (wxqe¯ +
∂w
∂e¯
xq)de¯− xqdw=0,
YQqdq + YQQdQ=0.
Setting dw = 0, and using that dQ = −YQqdq/YQQ we obtain:
dq
de¯
=
(wxqe¯ +
∂w
∂e¯
xq)YQQ
[(yqq − wxqq)YQQ − yqQYQq]
Further, using that dq = −YQQdQ/YQq, we also obtain:
dQ
de¯
=
−(wxqe¯ + ∂w∂e¯ xq)YQq
[(yqq − wxqq)YQQ − yqQYQq]
The denominator in both expressions is positive because of the as-
sumption of Nash-equilibrium uniqueness. YQQ is negative because of
9Consequently, there is also no diﬀerence between the closed loop and the open
loop solution concepts.
10See the discussion about uniqueness in Tirole[21], page 225-226.
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the assumption that the second order conditions for profit maximum
hold, and YQq is negative because of the assumption about outputs be-
ing strategic substitutes. Lastly, xqe¯ < 0 because of the assumption
that emissions are normal inputs. Hence, we have dq
de¯ | ∂w∂e¯ =0 > 0 and
dQ
de¯ |∂w∂e¯ =0 < 0.However, we also note that if
∂w
∂e¯
xq > |wxqe¯|, we have
dq
de¯
< 0, that is, competitiveness is improving in the emission quota
(proof of proposition 2).
By following the same approach, that is setting de¯ = 0 etc., it is also
easy to show that:
dq
dw
=
xqYQQ
[(yqq − wxqq)YQQ − yqQYQq]
Further, we also obtain:
dQ
de¯
=
−xqYQq
[(yqq − wxqq)YQQ − yqQYQq]
and hence, dq
dw
< 0 and dQ
dw
> 0.
A.2 Global market for pollution abatement
As shown above, the third and second stage of the game can be treated
as a one stage game in quantities. The two first order conditions for
profit maximization are now:
∂π/∂q = yq − wxq = 0, (32)
and
∂Π/∂Q = YQ − wXQ = 0. (33)
The two first-order conditions determine the Nash-equilibrium out-
put quantities given the emission quotas. Total diﬀerentiation of the
system (32) and (33) yields:
(yqq − wxqq)dq + yqQdQ− (wxqe¯ +
∂w
∂e¯
xq)de¯−
∂w
∂E¯
xqdE¯ − xqdw=0,
YQqdq + (YQQ − wXQQ)dQ−
∂w
∂e¯
XQde¯− (wXQE¯ +
∂w
∂E¯
XQ)dE¯ −XQdw=0.
Setting de¯ = dE¯ = 0, we obtain:
dq
dw
=
[(YQQ − wXQQ)xq − yqQXQ]
[(yqq − wxqq)(YQQ − wXQQ)− yqQYQq]
.
dQ
dw
=
[XQ(yqq − wxqq)− xqYQq]
[(YQQ − wXQQ)(yqq − wxqq)− yqQYQq]
.
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The uniqueness assumption ensures that the denominator in both
expressions is positive. Further, in a symmetric, unique equilibrium for
which e¯ = E¯, we must have xq = XQ, and |YQQ − wXQQ| > |yqQ|.
Hence, we have dq
dw |e¯=E¯ < 0 and
dQ
dw |e¯=E¯ < 0.
Further, setting dw = dE¯ = 0, we obtain:
dq
de¯
=
(YQQ − wXQQ)(wxqe¯ + ∂w∂e¯ xq)− yqQXQ
∂w
∂e¯
[(YQQ − wXQQ)(yqq − wxqq)− yqQYQq]
.
dQ
de¯
=
−YQq(wxqe¯ + ∂w∂e¯ xq) + (yqq − wxqq)XQ
∂w
∂e¯
[(YQQ − wXQQ)(yqq − wxqq)− yqQYQq]
Firstly, note that dq
de¯ | ∂w∂e¯ =0 > 0. Further, note that
∂w
∂e¯
xq > |wxqe¯|, is
no longer a suﬃcient condition for having either dq
de¯
< 0 or dQ
de¯
> 0.
By following the same approach, that is setting dw, de¯ = 0, it is also
easy to show that dQ
dE¯ | ∂w∂e¯ =0 > 0.
A.3 Local markets for pollution abatement
The two first order conditions for profit maximization are now:
∂π/∂q = yq − wxq = 0, (34)
and
∂Π/∂Q = YQ −WXQ = 0. (35)
The two first-order conditions determine the Nash-equilibrium out-
put quantities given the emission quotas. Total diﬀerentiation of the
system (34) and (35) yields:
(yqq − wxqq)dq + yqQdQ− (wxqe¯ +
∂w
∂e¯
xq)de¯−
∂w
∂E¯
xqdE¯ − xqdw=0,
YQqdq + (YQQ −WXQQ)dQ−
∂w
∂e¯
XQde¯− (WXQE¯ +
∂W
∂E¯
XQ)dE¯ −XQdW =0.
Setting de¯ = dE¯ = dW = 0, we obtain:
dq
dw
=
xq(YQQ −WXQQ)
[(yqq − wxqq)(YQQ − wXQQ)− yqQYQq]
,
which is negative. And,
dQ
dw
=
−xqYQq
[(yqq − wxqq)(YQQ − wXQQ)− yqQYQq]
.
which is positive. By following the same approach, that is setting
dw, de¯, dE¯ = 0 , it is also easy to show that dq
dW
> 0 and dQ
dW
< 0 etc.
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B The upstream market for abatement solutions
The demand function for pollution abatement services is:
w = w(e¯, x).
Diﬀerentiating we get:
dw
dx
=
1
xq
dq
dw
< 0,
which makes the demand curve downward sloping, and further:
dw
de¯
=
xq
∂q
∂e¯
+ xe¯
−xq ∂q∂w
.
The sign on the nominator is ambiguous. The direct eﬀect of a higher
emission quota i.e. e¯ ↑, is to decrease the demand for pollution abate-
ment (the last term in the nominator). However, setting a higher emis-
sion quota also leads to higher downstream output in Nash-equilibrium,
see (5) above. This boosts the demand for pollution abatement. We
assume that the direct eﬀect dominates, and hence, by assumption:
∂w
∂e¯
< 0.
Each abatement supply firm maximizes profit Ω taking n as given:
max
xi
%
w(e¯,
n[
i=1
xi)− α
&
xi − f(n),
from which we obtain the following first-order condition (assuming
symmetric firms):
∂w
∂x
x¯+ w(e¯, nx¯)− α = 0.
Further, assuming that the second order condition is fulfilled i.e.
∂2Ω/∂(xi)
2 < 0, and solving this problem, we get: x1 = ... = xi = ... =
xn = x¯(n, e¯). By diﬀerentiating the first order condition, we can look at
the derivatives of x¯(n, e¯):
dx¯(n, e¯)
dn|de¯=0
= −
k
∂2w
∂n∂x
+ ∂w
∂x
l
x¯
∂2Ω/∂(xi)2
< 0. (36)
dx¯(n, e¯)
de¯|dn=0
= −
∂2w
∂e¯∂x
x¯+ ∂w
∂e¯
∂2Ω/∂(xi)2
. (37)
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The nominator in (37) is hard to sign, since we do not know the sign
on the cross-derivative. If ∂
2w
∂e¯∂x
< 0, we get dx¯(n,e¯)
de¯|dn=0
< 0.
Knowing x¯(n, e¯), we may find n from the zero profit condition:
Ωi = [w(e¯, nx¯(n, e¯))− α] x¯(n, e¯)− f(n) = 0,
which yields: n = n(e¯). We diﬀerentiate the zero profit condition,
and get:
dn
de¯
= −
k
∂w
∂e¯
+ n∂w
∂x
dx¯
de¯
l
x¯+ [w(e¯, nx¯)− α] dx¯
de¯
∂w
∂x
k
x¯(n, e¯) + n dx¯
dn
l
x¯+ [w(e¯, nx¯)− α] dx¯
dn
+ f 
By expanding w(e¯, n(e¯)x¯(n(e¯), e¯)) we get the following:
dw
de¯
=
∂w
∂e¯
+
∂w
∂x
%
n
dx¯
de¯
+ x¯
dn
de¯
+ n
dx¯
dn
dn
de¯
&
.
From (9) we have ∂w
∂x
< 0, and we have assumed ∂w
∂e¯
< 0. Hence, in
order to have dw
de¯
> 0, the terms in brackets, have to be negative. The
first term is negative if ∂
2w
∂e¯∂x
< 0, while the latter terms take diﬀerent
signs respectively of dn
de¯
being negative or positive.
Assume that dx¯
de¯
< 0, ∂w
∂e¯
+n∂w
∂x
dx¯
de¯
> 0 and that x¯+n dx¯
dn
= 0. We then
have dw
de¯
> 0, but we still cannot sign dn
de¯
.
C Solving the examples
C.1 Unilateral policy
Let emissions s be given by f(x, q) = ( υ
σx+µ
)q. Given an emission quota
e¯, the demand for abatement solutions is given: x = υq
σe¯
− µ
σ
. Further, let
export demand be given: p = m − q − Q where p is the export market
price and m the market size. We then have for the Nash equilibrium
quantities of the domestic and foreign industry:
q =
m− 2(wυ
σe¯
)
3
,
Q =
m+ (wυ
σe¯
)
3
.
The inverse demand for abatement eﬀort:
w =
υσme¯− 3σµ(e¯)2
2υ2
− 3(σe¯)
2
2υ2
x.
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Define then:
λ ≡ υσme¯− 3σµ(e¯)
2
2υ2
,
τ ≡ 3(σe¯)
2
2υ2
.
Given n, each R&D firm maximizes:
max
xi
%
λ− τ
n[
i=1
xi − α
&
xi.
Solving the maximization problem yields:
x1 = ... = xi = ... = xn =
λ− α
τ (n+ 1)
.
If f is independent of n, the number of firms in the intermediate
goods industry is then decided by the zero profit condition:
1
τ
%
λ− α
(n+ 1)
&2
− f = 0
from which we obtain:
n =
λ− α√
τf
− 1.
This can then be inserted back into the expression for xi and w. We
have: xi =
t
f
τ
and w = α+
√
τf . Define f ≡ 2β2
3
. We then get:
w = α+
σe¯
υ
β.
Hence, we note that we have dw
de¯
> 0.
If we include spillovers; f = 2β
2
3(n+1)φ , we get for n:
n =
%
λ− α√
τf
& 2
2−φ
− 1,
which also makes it possible to solve for the price. In our simulations
we have used σ = υ = µ = 1.
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C.2 A global abatement market
Let s = q
x+1
/S = Q
X+1
. Given an emission quota e¯/E¯, the demand for
abatement solutions is given: x = q
e¯
− 1/X = Q
E¯
− 1. Further, let export
demand be given: p = m− q−Q where p is the export market price and
m the market size. The Nash equilibrium quantities of the domestic and
foreign industry are then given:
q =
m− 2(w
e¯
) + (w
E¯
)
3
,
Q =
m− 2(w
E¯
) + (w
e¯
)
3
.
Further, total demand Z for abatement eﬀort is:
Z = x+X =
me¯E¯
k
e¯+ E¯
l
− 6e¯2E¯2 − 2
k
E¯2 − e¯E¯ + e¯2
l
w
3e¯2E¯2
,
which can be inverted:
w =
1
2
k
E¯2 − e¯E¯ + e¯2
l
q
me¯E¯
k
e¯+ E¯
l
− 6e¯2E¯2 − 3e¯2E¯2Z
r
.
As above, define:
λ ≡
me¯E¯
k
e¯+ E¯
l
− 6e¯2E¯2
2
k
E¯2 − e¯E¯ + e¯2
l ,
τ ≡ 3e¯
2E¯2
2
k
E¯2 − e¯E¯ + e¯2
l .
We have Z =
nS
i=1
xi. Given n, each R&D firm maximizes:
max
xi
%
λ− τ
n[
i=1
xi − α
&
xi,
Which for f independent of n, can be solved as above. We w =
α+
√
τf . Define f ≡ 2β2
3
. We then get:
w = α+
e¯E¯uk
E¯2 + e¯2 − e¯E¯
lβ (w|e¯=E¯ = α+ βe¯).
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It is then easy to find the symmetric policy equilibrium by simulating
the model in Exel. With f(n) = 2β
2
3(n+1)φ , we get for n:
n =

λ− αt
2τβ2
3


2
2−φ
− 1,
which also makes it possible to find the policy equilibrium in case of
spillovers.
C.3 Two local abatement markets
Using the same model as above, we find that the Nash equilibrium quan-
tities of the domestic and foreign industry can be written:
q =
m− 2(w
e¯
) + (W
E¯
)
3
,
Q =
m− 2(W
E¯
) + (w
e¯
)
3
,
where W is the price on abatement in the foreign country. Since
the game is symmetric, we only have to look at one of the countries.
Domestic demand x for R&D eﬀort is then:
x =
me¯E¯ − 3e¯2E¯ +We¯− 2wE¯
3e¯2E¯
,
which can be inverted:
w =
me¯E¯ − 3e¯2E¯ +We¯
2E¯
− 3e¯
2
2
x.
Define then:
λ ≡ me¯E¯ − 3e¯
2E¯ +We¯
2E¯
,
τ ≡ 3e¯
2
2
.
We have x =
nS
i=1
xi. Each domestic abatement firm maximizes profit
taking n, e¯ andW as given, while each foreign abatement firm maximizes
profit taking N , E¯ and w as given. From above we then know: n =
λ−α√
τf
− 1, xi =
t
f
τ
and w = α+
√
τf . Define f ≡ 2β2
3
. We then have:
w = α+ βe¯.
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And correspondingly:
W = α+ βE¯
Hence, in the example, there is no foreign price eﬀect. Once again, it
is easy to find the symmetric policy equilibrium. Note that for e¯ = E¯, the
expression for the price is the same in all three cases. It is the diﬀerent
sign on the strategic eﬀect ∂Q
∂w
dw
de¯
which causes the policy equilibria to be
diﬀerent.
C.4 Proportional emission standard
In order to look further into the robustness of dw
de¯
> 0, we also look at
another example. The emission function for the down stream industry
is:
f(q, x) = q −√qx, x ≤ √q,
where x is abatement eﬀort. Note that this emission function also
inhibits increasing returns to production scale q with respect to the eﬀect
of abatement. The government sets a proportional emission standard
(1 − r), which implies e
q
≤ (1 − r). We then have that the demand for
abatement solutions can be written:
x = r2q,
and we get the following reduced form cost function:
c(q, r) = wr2q.
let export demand be given: p = m − q − Q where p is the export
market price and m the market size. We then have that the Nash equi-
librium quantity of the domestic and foreign industry can be written:
q =
m− 2wr2
3
,
Further, the inverse demand for R&D eﬀort:
w =
mr2 − 3x
2r4
,
Going through the same exercise as above, we have for the no spillover
case:
w|φ=0 = α+
β
2r2
.
Hence, the price on pollution abatement is falling in the level of
environmental regulation r.
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C.5 Abatement subsidy
In the abatement subsidy case, we have for the Nash equilibrium quan-
tities of the domestic and foreign industry:
q =
m− 2( (1−Γ)w
e¯
)
3
,
Q =
m+ ( (1−Γ)w
e¯
)
3
.
The inverse demand for abatement eﬀort:
w =
me¯− 3(e¯)2
2(1− Γ) −
3(e¯)2
2(1− Γ)x.
Define then:
λ ≡ me¯− 3(e¯)
2
2(1− Γ) ,
τ ≡ 3(e¯)
2
2(1− Γ) .
Going through the same exercise as above, we have: n =

λ−α√
τf
 2
2−φ
−
1, xi =
t
f
τ
and w = α+
√
τf . Define f ≡ 2β2
3
. We then get:
xi =
2
t
(1− Γ)β
3e¯
(no spillovers)
w = α+
e¯β√
1− Γ
(no spillovers)
n =
%
me¯− 3(e¯)2 − 2(1− Γ)α
2
√
1− Γe¯β
& 2
2−φ
−1 (general case - with/without spillovers)
Note that we have dw
dΓ > 0 and
∂xi
∂Γ < 0 in the no spillovers case.
However, it is easy to show that marginal cost, that is, w(e¯,Γ)(1−Γ)
e¯
=
α(1−Γ)
e¯
+
√
1− Γβ, is decreasing in Γ, and hence, domestic output is
increasing in Γ.
When calculating welfare total subsidy costs, Γwnx¯ must be sub-
tracted from net surplus.
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C.6 Entry subsidy
An upstream entry subsidy is even simpler to build into our example.
With an entry subsidy we have f(n) = (1−ρ) 2β2
3(n+1)φ where ρ is the share
of the entry costs financed by the government. Solving for n we get:
n =
%
me¯− 3(e¯)2 − 2α
2
√
1− ρe¯β
& 2
2−φ
− 1 (general case - with/without spillovers).
When calculating welfare total subsidy costs, ρn 2β
2
3(n+1)φ must be sub-
tracted from net surplus.
D Abatement subsidy - general case
Let Γ denote the share of the downstream industry’s abatement costs
paid by the government. We then have for the cost of the downstream
firm:
c(q, e¯) = (1− Γ)wx(q, e¯),
which implies that downstream output can be written q = q((1 −
Γ)w, e¯).
The upstream demand function becomes: x = x(q((1 − Γ)w, e¯), e¯)
which can be inverted to yield w = w(e¯,x)
(1−Γ) where w is the price on abate-
ment eﬀort charged by the upstream firms. Each abatement firm maxi-
mizes:
max
xi


w(e¯,
nS
i=1
xi)
(1− Γ) − α

xi − f(n),
from which we obtain the following first-order condition (assuming
symmetric firms):
∂w
∂x
x¯+ w(e¯, nx¯)− (1− Γ)α = 0.
Thus, the downstream abatement subsidy has an indirect eﬀect on
the upstream market; it lowers the marginal cost of upstream firms.
Solving as in Section 2 yields, xi = xi(n, e¯,Γ). By inserting back into
the profit expression, we get n = n(e¯,Γ), and finally w = w(e¯,Γ). The
sign on ∂w
∂Γ is ambiguous, and hence, the signs on
∂q
∂Γ and
∂Q
∂Γ are also
ambiguous even though the direct eﬀect of the subsidy is to reduce the
price on abatement.
Net surplus, NS, generated by the domestic downstream firm in the
deployment subsidy case is given:
NS = y(q((1− Γ)w(e¯,Γ), e¯), Q((1− Γ)w(e¯,Γ), e¯))
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−(1− Γ)w(e¯,Γ)x(q((1− Γ)w(e¯,Γ), e¯), e¯)
−Γw(e¯,Γ)x(q((1− Γ)w(e¯,Γ), e¯), e¯)− d(e¯),
where the two first terms denote downstream firm profit, and the two
latter terms are the subsidy costs and the environmental damage costs,
respectively. The optimal emission quota and subsidy are given from a
set of two first order conditions.
We have for the optimal emission quota:
yQ
dQ
de¯
− Γw(e¯,Γ)xq
dq
de¯
− x∂w
∂e¯
= w(e¯,Γ)xe¯ + d
. (38)
We have for the optimal subsidy:
yQ
dQ
dΓ
− Γw(e¯,Γ)xq
dq
dΓ
− x∂w
∂Γ
= 0. (39)
Rearranging and combining:
yQ
dq
dΓ
%
dQ
de¯
dq
dΓ
− dQ
dΓ
dq
de¯
&
+ x
%
∂w
∂Γ
dq
de¯
dq
dΓ
− ∂w
∂e¯
&
= w(e¯,Γ)xe¯ + d
. (40)
Denote marginal cost of the firmmcd. We then have
dQ
de¯
dq
dΓ =
dQ
dmcd
dmcd
de¯
dq
dmcd
dmcd
dΓ ,
and likewise dQ
dΓ
dq
de¯
= dQ
dmcd
dmcd
dΓ
dq
dmcd
dmcd
de¯
. Hence, the bracket
k
dQ
de¯
dq
dΓ −
dQ
dΓ
dq
de¯
l
is zero, and (40) is reduced to:
x
%
∂w
∂Γ
dq
de¯
dq
dΓ
− ∂w
∂e¯
&
= w(e¯,Γ)xe¯ + d
.
Proposition 5 then follows directly.
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